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I. Introduction to NAFTA.
After much deliberation and ballyhoo, the anticipated arrival of the North
American Free Trade Agreement was finally realized on January 1, 1994.2 The immediate
effect was the creation of the world's largest market, consisting of 380 million people,
trading some $8 trillion worth of goods and services annually.3 The North American
continent launched a new approach to business dealings, designed to eliminate barriers to
free trade and commerce.4 The United States, Canada, and Mexico's primary objectives
were to provide greater market access, to make that access more secure, and to allow mar-
ket forces to work.5 In order to satisfy these goals, tariff barriers and quota systems that
limit the entry of foreign goods were eliminated. 6
The long-term goal of the United States, however, is the successful integration of
the entire Western Hemisphere. The United States wishes to utilize the NAFTA as a vehi-
cle to achieve this objective, eventually eliminating all barriers to trade. Part II of this
comment traces the decision of the NAFTA signatories to extend an invitation to Chile.
Next, this comment briefly analyzes the concept of the Western Hemisphere Free Trade
Area ("WHFTA") and the United States' role in its procurement, with a discussion of the
Summit of the Americas. Part III will trace the historical development of Chile's econo-
my, examine the benefits of accession to Chile and to the United States, identify the prob-
lems facing the Chilean accession with particular focus on the problems with the Chilean
environment and the preventive measures Chile has taken to remedy the concerns, and
discuss the failure of the U.S. Congress to grant fast track authority to the President.
Finally, Part IV of the article addresses the impact of Chile's decision to join the MERCO-
SUR and the ramifications of this decision on possible accession to the NAFTA.
II. The Development of a Free Trade Zone.
A. THE UNITED STATES' RoLE AND THE ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS.
Throughout the past century, the United States guarded its economic indepen-
dence. 7 The U.S. chose to enter into numerous bilateral relationships rather than join the
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement, drafted Aug. 12, 1992, revised Sept. 6, 1992, U.S-
Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. J.F. Hornbeck, Chilean Trade and Economic Reform: Implications for NAFTA Accession, CRS
Report for Congress, June 23, 1995, at 1.
4. NAFTA, supra note 1. See Preamble, which states in part, "REDUCE distortions to trade;
ESTABLISH clear and mutually advantageous rules governing their trade; ENSURE a pre-
dictable commercial framework for business planning and investment."
5. Michael Reynolds, Comment, Examining the Foundation for a Free Trade Zone in the
Americas, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 521,528 (1994).
6. Christopher J. lamarino, Note, Technical Barriers to Trade Under the NAFTA System: A Call
for Legitimate Protection, 21 J. LEGIS. 111, 111 (1995).
7. JOSEPH GRUNWALD ET AL., LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND U.S. POLICY 65-67
(1972).
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integration processes prevalent throughout the world.8 Beginning in the 1960s, the
United States gradually began to shift away from protecting its economic independence
and toward the creation of a free hemispheric trade zone.9 The movement from the dis-
tant neighbor relationship coincided with the growth of Latin American economies, now
recognized as the fastest growing regional market for U.S. exports.' 0
The initial development signaling the economic decision to secure free trade
throughout the hemisphere can be traced to President Bush's announcement of the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative ("EAI"). 11 During his December 1990 visit to
South America, Bush called for a new economic partnership, envisioning a hemispheric
free trade area stretching "(f)rom Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego."12 The goal of the EAI
was to support Latin American economic reform efforts through programs that empha-
sized trade, as opposed to aid.13 However, the principal pillar of the EAI was the creation
of a hemispheric free trade area, defined as a market in which goods and services circulate
and sell without the levying of tariffs or duties at national borders. 14
During this visit, Bush clearly identified Chile as a candidate for a free trade
agreement with the United States. 15 However, negotiations between the two nations were
delayed until the conclusion of the NAFTA. 16 When President Clinton took office in
1993, he reassured the Chilean government that the United States would renew free trade
negotiations upon the completion of the NAFTA.17
8. Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles Under a
NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 127, 148 (1995).
9. Id.
10. Latin America: Policy Reforms Fueling Economic Growth in Latin America, US Exports, 9 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 890 (1992); Latin America: Latin America Fastest Growing Market for US
Exports, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1101 (1992).




14. Sharon Bowden & Martin Elling, Recent Development, In The Shadow of 1992: Developing
Country Efforts at Economic Integration, 32 HARv. INT'L L. J. 537,552, n.1 (1991).
15. Chile and US Sign Accord Seen Leading to Free-Trade Pact, WALL ST. I., Oct. 2,1990, at B6.
16. Kevin M. Jordan, Comment, Intellectual Property Under NAFTA: Is Chile Up to the
Challenge?, 2 TULSA J. COMP. INT'L L. 367,367-368 (1995).
17. Id.
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Yet, in early 1994, the United States was still unclear about how to proceed with
achieving its goal of free trade with Chile. Ultimately, several domestic problems
emerged with the negotiation process, mainly involving political maneuvering around the
approval of fast-track authority for the President. Finally, combined with some political
pressuring from both Canada and Mexico, the United States extended a formal invitation
to Chile to join NAFTA at the Summit of the Americas held in Miami, December 9-11,
1994.18 Canada's Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, stated, "(f)or one year now we have been
three amigos, starting today we will become the four amigos"19
B. THE SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS---CHILE'S FoRMAL INVITATION TO THE
NAFTA EXTENDED.
The Summit of the Americas("Summit"), hosted by President Clinton, united all
thirty-four democratically elected leaders of the Western Hemisphere. 20 The thirty-four
countries in attendance pledged to negotiate the "Free Trade Area of the Americas" by
2005, in order to improve the relationships among the nations and improve the quality of
life in the hemisphere. 21 These resolutions are contained in two documents: the
Declaration of Principle, which outlines the broad objectives of a Hemispheric
Partnership for Development and Prosperity; and the Plan of Action, which delineates
specific actions that the summit governments pledge to take in implementing the com-
mitments in the declaration. 22 These two principles establish the foundation for creating
a free trade area throughout the Western Hemisphere.
By 2002, the creation of a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area is projected to
result in a $36 billion rise in exports from the United States to Latin America, a 51%
increase over estimates absent integration. 23 Further, Latin America's gross domestic
product ("GDP") could increase by over $273 billion.24 This improvement in economic
stability is increasingly important to the U.S., considering that Latin America is the only
region left in the world where the United States enjoys a trade surplus. 25 Moreover, U.S.
trade with Latin America will surpass that with Europe by the year 2000.26
18. The initial problems surrounding the Chilean accession involved the decision of whether to
utilize NAFTA, or sign a separate free trade agreement with Chile. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
DISPATCH 31, Vol. 6 (1994).
19. Julian Beltrame, Chile Becomes Fourth 'Amigo' to Board North American Free Trade
Bandwagon, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 12, 1994, at Al.
20. Only Cuba was absent. Id.; see also Helene Cooper & Jose de Cordoba, Chile is Invited to Join
NAFTA as US Pledges Free-Trade Zonefor Americas, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12,1994, at A3.
21. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DISPATCH 31, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY. J. ScHoTr, ASSISTED BY DEANNA CLARK, WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, (1994); see also Western Hemispheric Free Trade to Boost Economy,
XINHUA NEws AGENCY, July 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ALLNSA File.
24. HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 23.
25. Michael G. Wilson, Building on the NAFTA: Forging a Free Trade Agreement with Chile,
HERITAGE FOUND. REP., June 27, 1994 at n. 991, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, HFRPTS
File.
26. Jorge Banales, NAFTA Deal Unlikely this Year, UPI, July 20, 1994.
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III. The Effects of the Chilean Accession.
A. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILE.
The announcement of Chile's invitation was the culmination of several reports
examining the feasibility of a successful accession.27 The initial determinations focused
on the political as well as the economic stability of Chile.28 At one time, Chile enjoyed
the longest uninterrupted democratic tradition in Latin America.29 However, following
the election of SalVadore Allende in 1970, Chile began to suffer tremendous turmoil as
Allende implemented a socialist system.30 As a result, General Augosto Pinochet assumed
power from Allende in 1973, abruptly ending the line of peaceful governmental transi-
tions.3 1 The new regime solicited help from American economic advisors at the
University of Chicago and returned Chile to a capitalist, free-market economy.32
Chile is the most economically developed nation in South America, primarily as
a result of General Augosto Pinochet's decision to experiment with free-market princi-
ples. 33 Pinochet's reforms sought to reduce tariffs, eliminate subsidies and price controls,
and privatize state enterprises. 34 General Pinochet's tough fiscal policies also stimulated
the economic recovery by reducing the national debt 35 These policies resulted in an
average "GDP" growth of 7.1%, while reducing tariff levels to a flat rate of about 10%, the
lowest in South America.36
In 1990, Patricio Aylwin assumed the presidency from General Pinochet, return-
ing Chile to a democratic nation.3 7 In light of the success Pinochet experienced,
President Aylwin wisely decided to continue his economic policies. 38 Inflation is project-
ed to fall to single digits, and the unemployment level hovers at 4.5%.39 Meanwhile, the
27. See Wilson, supra note 25.
28. Id.
29. David Gilmore, Expanding NAFTA to Include All of the Western Hemisphere: Making Chile the
Next Member, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 413,414 (1994).
30. Id at 414.
31. Id
32. PAMELA CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE UNDER PINOCHET
166-189 (1991).
33. Id
34. Wilson, supra note 25.
35. Id
36. Id; see Michael Lyster, NAFTA's Next Stop: Chile, ORANGE Co. Bus. J., April 11, 1994, § 1 at 1;
see also Pinochet Sends the Chicago Boys Back to Schoo4 THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 1985, at 60.
37. Edward C. Snyder, Notes and Comments, The Menem Revolution in Argentina: Progress
Toward a Hemispheric Free Trade Area, 29 TEX. INT'L L. J. 95,98 (1994).
38. Id.
39. Timothy O'Leary, Jewel of Latin America Booming Chile Stands in Line After Mexico to join
NAFTA, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 1994, at B3; Wilson, supra note 25.
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"GDP" has continued to grow, reaching almost $42 billion, making Chile one of the
fastest growing economies in the world.40 This economic liberalization and robust
growth prompted the United States's interest in induding Chile in the NAFTA.4 1
Current President Eduardo Frei42 has faced enormous pressure to yield results
similar to the successful regime of Aylwin. In contrast to Pinochet's relentless pursuit of
unregulated growth, Frei has directed Chile toward a policy of measured economic
growth. 43 Frei continues to expand Chile's trade, encouraging foreign investment and
seeking additional trade partners in Latin America. 44 The decision to establish additional
trade pacts with other Latin American nations enhances Chile's economic viability and
the NAFTAs choice of a fourth member.
B. THE BENEFITS TO CHILE.
Chile's accession to NAFTA will create numerous advantages, the foremost being
facilitated entrance to one of the largest markets in the world.45 With a population of
over 380 million and a "GDP" representing 30% of the globe, the NAFTA will provide a
strong market for Chilean exports. 46 Conversely, increased access to Chile's markets will
invite tremendous economic investment opportunities from both the United States and
Canada, along with the technological advancements that invariably accompany such
investments. 47 These investments will further the Chilean economy through moderniza-
tion and improved access to capital.48
Moreover, accession to the NAFTA will not harm Chile because its primary
exports are goods, such as fruits, vegetables, and fish, rather than services.4 9 Although
some sectors of Chilean agriculture worry that the NAFTA will eventually eliminate sub-
sidies, the overall impact on farming should be minimal. 50 Chile's growing season is
opposite that of the United States, thus reducing harm from competition. 51 In fact,
Chilean producers tend to complement U.S. fresh fruit deficiencies during winter
months.5
2
40. Lyster, supra note 36.
41. Chile is Only Latin American Country Ready to Negotiate FTA, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 946,
946 (May 27, 1992).
42. Frei, son of former President Montalva, won the December 1993 election with 58% of the
presidential vote. Frei took office on March 11, 1994 for a six-year term. Chilean President
Elect Outlines Environmental Policy for Next Administration, ENv'T WATCH LATN AM., Jan. 1,
1994.
43. Scott C. Lacunza, Note, From Dictatorship to Democracy: Environmental Reform in Chile, 19
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 539, 591 (1996).
44. Roger Turner, Chile Sets an Example for Others to Follow, Bus. AM., May 1994, at 18.
45. Hornbeck, supra note 3.
46. Id.
47. Gilmore, supra note 29, at 418.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Hornbeck, supra note 3, at 17.
51. ld.
52.. Id..
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The overall impact of the NAFTA on Chile should be very beneficial. 5 3
Currently, the United States accounts for over 16% of Chilean exports, as well as 22% of
imports, 54 making the U.S. Chile's top trading partner, reaching over $4.4 billion annual-
ly.55 The United States represents not only a large market for Chilean traded goods, but
also a market that will continue to absorb more Chilean goods as the U.S. economy
expands. 56 More importantly, membership in the NAFI'A will provide future benefits in
addition to short-term assistance. 57 With the removal of tariff barriers, foreign invest-
ment will spur economic growth in Chile.58 Moreover, accession to NAFTA will lead to
increased trade with other Latin American countries. 59 Ultimately, this influx of cash and
capital will increase salaries and improve employment opportunities domestically, pro-
viding an opportunity to pursue economic integration with the world.60
C. BENEFITS TO THE UNITED STATES.
Chile is not the only nation that will garner the benefits from entry into the
NAFTA. U.S. businesses, particularly in technology sectors, will thrive. 61 Despite Chile's
small economic base, U.S. imports have increased more than 200% in the last seven
years.62 This increase has created a trade surplus that has widened in five of the last six
years.63 With the continued maturation of Chile's economy, no end is in sight for
Chilean demand for technology.64
With the eventual goal of procuring free trade throughout the Western
Hemisphere, the accession of Chile serves the identical political purpose as Mexico's entry
in the NAFTA. 65 While the inclusion of Chile will have a minute overall economic
impact on the NAFTA, accession will be viewed as a symbol of the commitment by the
U.S. toward strengthening economic ties with the rest of Latin America. Similar to
Mexico, Chile is identified as a leader among many South and Latin American nations. 66
Currently, many countries, including El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Colombia, are follow-
ing Chile's economic blueprints.67 In fact, Mexico followed Chile's lead in creating a free
market economy, privatizing state enterprises and reducing inflation by more than 150%
in four years. 68 The inclusion of Chile into the NAFTA would promote further economic
53. Id at 9; Wilson, supra note 25.
54. Hornbeck, supra note 2, at 10.
55. Id at 10, 15.
56. Id at 15.
57. See Wilson, supra note 25; see also Hornbeck, supra note 3.
58. Wilson, supra note 25.
59. Id
60. Id.
61. Most of the U.S. imports into Chile are high-technology products, such as computers. Id.
62. Gilmore, supra note 29, at 419.
63. Hornbeck, supra note 3, at 11.
64. See Gilmore, supra note 29, at 419.
65. Id. at 419-420; see Hornbeck, supra note 3, at 1.
66. Wilson, supra note 25.
67. Id.
68. Snyder, supra note 37, at 98.
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reform and, more importantly, instill confidence that a Western Hemispheric Free Trade
Area is possible. 69
D. PROBLEMS WITH CHILE'S ACCESSION TO NAFTA.
1,. Environmental Concerns.
a. Introduction.
The robust growth of Chile's economy has taken its toll on the ecology. The
unregulated growth favored by Pinochet's administration has caused serious environ-
mental degradation, in particular air pollution and rampant water contamination. 70
Primarily, the concerns about the environment resulted from the exploitation of Chile's
natural resources, most notably the mining industry.71 As a result of Chile's aggressive
economic policies, Chile was characterized as an ecological disaster. 72
Chile, however, has recognized its serious environmental problems and has initi-
ated programs designed to correct the deficiencies. As discussed below, Decree 185 was
enacted in 1991 to establish air quality standards, while simultaneously creating and out-
lining the duties of the responsible authority, the National Commission of the
Environment ("CONOMA"). 73 Finally, Chile also constructed the Environmental
Framework Law ("EFL") in 1994.74 The EFL fullyincorporates all environmental regula-
tions and enforcement authorities relating to pollution control.
b. Decree 185.
The unregulated dumping of hazardous waste by the mining industry prompted
the Chilean government to take immediate corrective measures. 75 In response to the
increasingly dangerous level of toxic emissions, the Chilean Mining Ministry issued
Decree 185.76 The purpose of Decree 185 was to control the emission levels of plants. In
69. Hornbeck, supra note 3, at 16.
70. Tim Frasca, Chile Seeks to Reverse Years of Pollution, CHRISIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 23, 1990, at
4.
71. Alexander Huneeus, Chile Environmental Mess Prompts Warning by U.S., S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7,
1992, at A9.
72. Paul Mylrea, Chile's Capital, Plagued by Smog, Begins to Fight Back, REUTER LIBR. REP., Sept.
14, 1990, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, TXTNWS File.
73. Chilean Government Promotes New Sense of Environmental Responsibility, 16 INT'L ENVTL REP.
(BNA) 309 (Apr. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Chilean Government Promotes].
74. The Environmental Framework Law, Ley de Bases del Medio Ambiente, codified at D.L.
19,300, was promulgated on March 14,1994. [hereinafter "EFLU] The EFL encompasses pro-
visions governing water contamination and air pollution.
75. Chilean Government Promotes, supra note 73.
76. Id.
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order to accomplish this goal, the levels of sulfur, arsenic, and particulate emissions were
regulated.77 The decree divided the country into two regions. The central and southern
sections of Chile, where the majority of the population is located, have stricter standards
than the scantily-populated northern region.7
As stated previously, Pinochet allowed the environment to suffer as the economy
prospered at its expense. Alywin, Pinochet's successor, attempted to curtail the damage to
the environment by enacting numerous laws and regulations. 79 However, in his attempt
to form a solution, Alywin failed to create a uniform body of law and a regulatory board
to monitor the progress of environmental reform and to enforce the newly enacted
laws.80 Therefore, to eliminate the conflicts and confusion surrounding these regulations,
Decree 185 created the governing body responsible for promoting the environmental
policies of Chile, CONOMA.8s The government granted CONOMA temporary authori-
ty to enforce the provisions of Decree 185 while developing an environmental
framework.82
Although Decree 185 has had a profound impact on the mining industry,83
extensive progress is unlikely. Combined with the steep costs of overhauling the mining
industry's reformation efforts and the government's decision to integrate the environ-
mental protection movement gradually, Chile is still far from a model in environmental
revolution.84
77. Achieving World Class as a Polluter; Mining Industry is Main Source of Sulphuric Acid
Emissions, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Mar. 19, 1992, at 11.
78. The more densely populated southern region had a maximum limit of 260 micrograms per
cubic meter of air, while a less stringent level of 365 micrograms per cubic meter of air was
set for the northern area. Air Polluters in Santiago Install Scrubbers as New SO and Particulate
Emissions Regulations Take Effect, ENV'T WATCH LATIN Am., Mar. 1, 1992. In addition, all
smelters were forced to decontaminate their emissions. Chilean Government Promotes,
supra note 73.
79. Chilean Congress Approves Environmental Framework Law, Bus. LATIN AM., Feb. 14, 1994.
80. Karin Ranta, Balancing Hardrock Mining and the Environment: The Chilean Model, 6 CoLo. J.
ENvTL. L. PoL'Y 423,430 (1995).
81. Chilean Government Promotes, supra note 73.
82. Id. Ultimately, CONOMA established the Environmental Framework Law.
83. Air Pollution Laws for Mines, Smelters Will Meet Global Standards Within Decade, 18 INT'L
ENVTL REP. (BNA) 959 (Dec. 13, 1995).
84. Id.
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c. The Environmental Framework Law.
Prior to the EFL, Chile enacted numerous environmental laws to correct its eco-
logical problems. Chile lacked, however, a comprehensive system to oversee the reform
efforts. The goal of the EFL is to organize Chile's existing environmental regulations and
coordinate the enforcement of the laws. 85 According to the EFL, CONOMA became the
responsible authority for creating policy and enforcing the regulations promulgated by
other agencies.8 6 Although the EFL fails to set specific standards, the framework does
seek to accomplish certain objectives by including broad standards for quality and
policy.8
7
The EFL redefined the role of CONOMA in monitoring environmental reform.
Regional branches of CONOMA, Consejo Regional de Medio Ambiente, or COREMA,
are responsible for the actual enforcement of the laws.88 The COREMAs' duty to moni-
tor is triggered when its particular region is affected.8 9 By delegating the authority to
enforce the EFL to the particular region affected, CONOMA is able to administrate and
monitor the effectiveness of the regulations.
The EFL also explicitly imposes liability for environmental degradation.9 0
Historically, the government, through its state-owned plants, was the primary perpetrator
of environmental harm. 91 Since only the government, the main violator, previously had
standing to sue, lawsuits seeking enforcement were non-existent. 92 Now, the EFL autho-
rizes citizens, nongovernmental organizations, and government officials to bring law-
suits.93 This provision should help curb the selective enforcement practiced in the past.
85. CONOMA created the EFL to establish clearer standards for environmental quality and emis-
sions control. CONOMA Creates Guidelines to Evaluate Environmental Impact Studies, ENV'T
WATCH LATIN Am., Nov. 1, 1993.
86. Chilean Senate Passes Environmental Framework Law, ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM., Sept. 1, 1993.
87. CONOMA deliberately established broad standards. The Chilean government decided to
determine specific standards in later regulations after a proper evaluation could occur.
88. The Environmental Framework Law, art. XXVI, supra note 74.
89. Id.
90. Ranta, supra note 80, at 434.
91. Chile's Environmental Framework Law Awaits President's Signature, ENV'T WATCH LATIN AM.,
Feb. 1, 1994.
92. 14
93. The Environmental Framework Law, art. LIV, supra note 74. The law only requires the plain-
tiff to demonstrate that a violation occurred, eliminating any requisite of intent to pollute.
Chile's Environmental Framework Law Awaits President's Signature, supra note 91.
180 NAFM. law and Business Review of the Americas
Although the EFL does possess flaws, 94 this comprehensive framework repre-
sents a solid foundation upon which to base Chile's environmental dean up efforts. Chile
has taken affirmative steps to eradicate the past environmental horrors while implement-
ing a system to prevent similar situations from occurring in. the future.
Chile has been criticized by the international community for its lax standards
regarding environmental matters. These failures to comply with accepted environmental
procedures raise serious concerns about Chile's accession to the NAFTA.95 Although the
Chilean public steadfastly opposes any changes, the government privately appears to be
conceding this matter.96 In fact, the head of Chile's National Environmental Commission
stated that an environmental agreement for NAFTA would be impossible to avoid
because,"[t]here is no trade agreement between any two countries that does not include
some kind of environmental element, to a greater or lesser degree " 97
2. Additional Obstacles Facing Chilean Accession.
Another problem facing the Chilean accession is the eventual removal of barriers
to competition.98 Currently, the Chilean National Society of Agriculture enjoys substan-
tial subsidies in sugar and wheat. 99 However, the NAFTA has numerous provisions
designed to eliminate these subsidies.100 The reaction of the Chilean agriculture to the
loss of the subsidies is unknown.101
94. First, the EFL is not retroactive. Unless a current violation can be established, plants are not
responsible for rectifying past pollution. Chile: Towards Greener Pastures, Bus. LATIN AM.,
Apr. 25, 1994. Second, CONOMA attempts to coordinate a large number of laws and regula-
tions under a single administrative unit. Conflicts between existing laws and jurisdictional
requirements are bound to complicate any efforts to successfully monitor and enforce the
laws. Ranta, supra note 80, at 434. Finally, the scope of what constitutes "environmental dam-
age" under the law is unclear. The interpretation of this term will change the extent of liabili-
ty for companies. The Environmental Framework Law, art. LIII, supra note 74.
95. NAFTA: Chile- US Trade Talks at "Risk" Over Enviro Regs?, GEENWIRE, Apr. 29,1994.
96. Gilmore, supra note 29, at 417.
97. Environment Must be in NAFTA-Chile EPA Head, REUTERS, Sept. 1, 1994.
98. See generally Reynolds, supra note 5.
99. IL at 543.
100. Id.
101. Meanwhile, several American agricultural groups are opposed to Chile's accession to the
NAFTA as well. On April 25, 1995, the USTR held a public hearing concerning Chilean
accession, allowing interest groups to voice their reactions. Among the numerous groups
that participated, the California Cling Peach Advisory Board and the National Association of
Growers and Processors for Fair Trade stated that the inclusion of Chile would substantially
hurt their industries through job displacement and their low-cost production capabilities, see
5 U.S. MEx. FREE TRADE REP. 8, Apr. 30, 1995.
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Some U.S. lawmakers still oppose Chilean accession on the grounds that Chile is
still not stable as a democratic nation.10 2 The current stand-off between the civilian gov-
ernment of Chilean President Eduardo Frei and Army Chief Gen. Augosto Pinochet poses
a major concern. 103 Opponents urge that talks with Chile be shelved until the military is
"shown to be firmly under the control of the elected government" 104
Some scholars also believe that Chile is not yet ready to accede to the NAFTA.10 5
Although the economy has improved dramatically, the exports sector lagged behind in its
development. 106 This lack of development is evidenced by the relatively low fixed invest-
ments, barely exceeding 20% of the "GDP"'107 Therefore, opponents of immediate
Chilean accession are requesting that talks be delayed until Chile develops a diversified
export sector.108 This sector should include products involving a greater degree of pro-
cessing and technological efforts in order to take advantage of available natural resources
while simultaneously integrating the sector more closely with the rest of the economy. 109
3. "Fast Track"Authority: The Major Roadblock to Accession.
The grand design that emerged from the Miami Summit appears to have stalled.
The problem has little to do with Chile and everything to do with American domestic
politics." 0 Currently, the United States has failed to provide President Clinton and U.S.
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor fast track authority to negotiate with Chile.11' Fast
track authority, developed for the Tokyo Round in 1974, is the procedure under which
Congress considers the submission of a trade agreement by the President with an "up-or-
down vote" Without fast track authority, most nations are reluctant to negotiate with the
U.S. for fear that Congress will amend the agreement and force still more concessions.
Fast track generally assures the bill actually presented is the one that the legislation will
likely pass. 112 Instead of fast track, the House Ways and Means Committee approved a
version of fast-track legislation that does not address the two key issues: labor and the
environment.113




105. See Manuel R. Agosin, Free Trade Agreements for Chile: Potential Benefits and Costs, 4
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21 (1994).




110. Finlay Lewis, Free Trade on Fast Track to Oblivion, THE SAN DIEGO UNION, Oct. 10, 1995, at
C3.
111. Peter Morton, Chile Won't be in NAFTA Before End of Year: MacLauren, THE FIN. POST, Oct.
13, 1995, at 5.
112. See Alissa J. Rubin, Trade: GOP Fast-Track Plans May Split Fragile Free Trade Coalition, CONG.
Q. WK. REP., July 10, 1995; see also Jeffrey E. Garten, American Trade Law in a Changing
World Economy, 9 INT'L L. 15, 20-21 (1995).
113. Tony Monroe, Clinton, Gingrich Divided on NAFTA Expansion, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May
23, 1995, at B6.
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At their first meeting in June 1995, trade ministers from Canada, Mexico and the
United States guaranteed that Chile would become the newest member of NAFTA before
January 1996.114 However, this prediction was before President Clinton solicited negoti-
ating authority from a Republican Congress. 115 Impeding the road to fast track is an
unlikely coalition consisting of left-wing Democrats and conservative Republicans, the
same group that opposed the NAFTA itself.116 Republicans are concerned with the
impact on their home-state industries, while Democrats worry over labor and environ-
mental concerns. 117 Democrats are expected to be particularly opposed to Chilean acces-
sion because these two topics are absent from the modified fast-track legislation.118
Additionally, the November 1996 election further complicates the issue of fast
track. 119 With former Senator Bob Dole running for President, Congress's approval of
fast track authority is unlikely.120 In addition, Pat Buchanan, a staunch critic of Clinton
and a necessary ally in the battle for approving fast track, has been particularly vocal in
his opposition to the Chilean accession. 121 Pointing to the current Mexican recession,
Buchanan argues that American exports are dwindling, and claims that more than 42,000
Americans have been thrown out of work as a result of the NAFTA. 122 Although these
figures may be a bit abstract and unfounded, the loss of American jobs pales in compari-
son with the frightening stories of American factories shutting down and moving to low-
wage Mexico. 123
Precedents for establishing agreements despite the lack of fast track authority do
exist. 124 Kantor has pointed out that the United States began negotiations on the
Uruguay Round, as well as free trade talks with Israel, before fast track authority was
granted. 125 In fact, Congress would probably approve an agreement without significant
change. 126
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However, absent fast track legislation, reaching an agreement is virtually inpos-
sible. 127 First, Chile would not negotiate with the U.S., knowing that the agreement
could be changed significantly when the NAFTA finally passes through Congress. 128
Moreover, despite the possibility that Congress might pass the agreement without fast
track, the U.S. can not guarantee the accession and Chile is not prepared to negotiate
without this guarantee.
12 9
The issue of fast track authority is a crucial one. Without fast track authority,
Chile's accession to the NAFTA will be delayed. 130 Although most U.S. Congressional
leaders along both party lines firmly support Chilean membership, several key procedural
disagreements remain. 131 While the absence of fast track only extends the eventual
acceptance of Chile, the delay sends a disquieting message to other Latin American coun-
tries who are following the negotiations, and to the goal of creating a free trade area
throughout the Western Hemisphere.132
IV. Chile Formalizes Agreement with the MERCOSUL
On March 26, 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay formed the
Southern Common Market (in Spanish, the Mercado del Cono Sur, or "MERCOSUR") by
signing the Treaty of Asunci6n. 133 With a population dose to 190 million people, the
governments of these countries agreed to create a common market by 1995.134 Seeking
to establish the MERCOSUR as a regional economic hub, the treaty was founded on a free
market philosophy. 135 Therefore, the Member States committed to eliminate intra
regional tariffs and to create a common external tariff to allow the MERCOSUR nations
to compete in the global marketplace.136
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The MERCOSUR began negotiating with Chile in 1994. However, discussions
reached an impasse while attempting to coordinate Chile's trade policies with those of the
MERCOSUR. 137 Chile possessed bilateral preferential trade agreements with each of the
MERCOSUR nations. Because each individual trade pact was determined by the nations'
level of economic development, these separate arrangements complicated the negotiation
process. 138
. Viewed by Chilean businesses, however, a MERCOSUR pact was essential to
expand upon Chile's increasing trade with the region. Therefore, to preserve access to the
bloc's 190 million consumers, Chilean President Fernando Frei cemented Chile's role with
the customs union by signing a formal agreement to become an associate member of the
MERCOSUR effective October 1, 1996.139
Chile currently maintains a uniform 11% import duty. In order to reconcile its
differing rates, Chile and MERCOSUR have erected a staggered timetable. 14 0
Approximately 80% of all Chilean exports will be subject to tariff reductions of 40%
when the agreement becomes effective. Similarly, two-thirds of the MERCOSUR exports
will be reduced by the same 40% rate.14 1
According to the agreed schedule, almost half of Chile's exports to the MERCO-
SUR nations will be duty-free by year 2004.12 At the same time, duties will be eliminat-
ed on close to 60% of MERCOSUR's total exports to Chile.143
The addition of Chile increases the number of consumers in the MERCOSUR to
over 200 million.144 Further, the MERCOSUR's gross domestic product rose to more
than $900 million. 145 Critics, however, are already debating the immediate economic
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impact of Chile's inclusion. The Argentine Chamber of Commerce predicts that trade
between the MERCOSUR and Chile will jump by $4 billion.145 Given Chile's relatively
diminutive size, other analysts are forecasting smaller returns. 146 Regardless of the dis-
parate economic forecasts, Chile provides several intangible benefits, induding stability
and credibility, which are arguably more important than the economic impacts.
Initially, skeptics dismissed the creation of the MERCOSUR. Analysts scoffed at
the notion of four under developed South American countries forming a trading bloc. 147
However, these nations were already in the process of overhauling their economies
through deregulation and privatization. 148 The bloc recognized the huge potential of
establishing a marketplace within South America. Therefore, the trade pact sought to
eliminate tariff barriers among themselves. Looming ominously over the MERCOSUR
was the fragile nature of the nations' domestic politics, as well as their relatively untested
economies. Although the MERCOSUR's success over the past five years has earned the
respect of analysts, Chile's addition solidifies the MERCOSUR as a substantial force in the
Western Hemisphere.
Chile represents the most stable nation in South America, politically and eco-
nomically. The MERCOSUR is more than simply a vehicle for trade and investment.149
Rather, the customs union is an attempt to achieve global recognition as a democratic
and economic power.150 Chile's presence, in addition to bolstering the economic frame-
work of the South American bloc, provides a foundation rich in democracy and econom-
ic prosperity that the MERCOSUR previously lacked. Moreover, the inclusion of Chile,
signifying the MERCOSUR's commitment to integration, has led indirectly to a pending
agreement with Bolivia scheduled to be completed by the end of 1996; negotiations to
incorporate Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are soon to follow.151
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Chile's associate membership includes express provisions that allow the nation
to continue to pursue other trade negotiations, notably the NAFTA. 153 Although the
MERCOSUR hopes that a South American free trade zone ("SAFTA") will be in place
before the NAFTA turns southward in the search for a Western hemispheric free trade
area, Chile's membership lends tremendous credence to the bloc's goal for trade integra-
tion. 154 Furthermore, Chile's geographic location provides additional benefits to the
MERCOSUR. Chile stretches along the majority of South America's western coastline,
denying access to the Pacific Ocean to the original members. With the rise in economic
developments of Asian nations, Chile thus represents the "missing link" between MER-
COSUR and Asia. 155
V. Conclusion.
As the premier nation in the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. has undertaken the
responsibility of eliminating all barriers to free trade. The United States has already taken
the initial step with the establishment of the NAFTA. Although the ultimate success of
the NAFTA remains unclear, a framework has been laid upon which to base future agree-
ments. The next step is the accession of additional nations beyond North America. The
U.S., Canada, and Mexico have identified Chile as the next most economically developed
nation in the hemisphere, and hope to use Chile's accession as a springboard towards a
WHFTA. Although each nation concedes that all parties will benefit from the removal of
free trade barriers, formidable obstacles remain to Chile's membership.
Chile is currently in the midst of correcting the environmental problems that
originated during the Pinochet administration. The deliberate ignorance of the environ-
ment to further the economy left Chile's ecology severely maligned. In order to satisfy the
NAFTA's requirements and bolster future trade possibilities, Chile has taken affirmative
steps to correct the past environmental degradations. The success of these preventive
measures rests largely upon whether the Chilean government can successfully balance the
stable growth of its economy while simultaneously creating and enforcing effective laws.
Moreover, the United States must resolve its internal political disputes surround-
ing fast track authority and focus on the actual negotiations. An early failure to fulfill its
promise to formalize Chile's accession has had a two-fold effect. First, Chile turned to the
MERCOSUR for trade partners. More importantly, the United States lost critical
momentum in the push to secure the confidence of Latin American nations. The com-
pletion of Chile's accession to the NAFTA is a vital step in achieving a free trade zone in
the Western Hemisphere and can only be accomplished once Congress grants fast track
authority.
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155. Id Equally important, Chile now has access to the Atlantic Ocean. Further, Chile will be able
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